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The Imperative of Modernized
Criminal Law Teaching
By B. J. GEORGE, JR.*
Gideon v. Wainwright' may prove to be not only a boon to
the average state felony defendant, but a major service to the
practicing bar itself. For the first time the judiciary and bar
together are forced to consider how not only to afford counsel to
the indigent, but to cure a serious condition in the legal profession
itself-its inability to provide adequate legal services in criminal
cases.
I. SYMPTOMS OF INADEQUACY
This inadequacy is manifested in several ways. One is the fact
alone of non-participation in criminal cases. No doubt any town
has its share of attorneys who shy away from criminal cases, but
the problem is acute in cities of a quarter million or more, in
which the percentage of lawyers doing a significant amount of
criminal law work is in inverse ratio to the population figure.2
This non-participation is rationalized in various ways.3 One is
to say that there is no money in criminal cases. This is probably
true, but money is not ordinarily the primary stated objective of
one who considers himself a professional; the image of a profes-
sional, to himself if not to others, is of one who serves needs in the
community, not of one who provides skills in return for pay.4
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., J.D., University of
Michigan.
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).2 For example, in the 1964 Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, there are 110
firm listings, of which 16 include "general practice in all courts", which might
include practice in Recorder's Court, and only 1 lists criminal practice in federal
courts. Of the 161 firms listed for San Francisco, 4 list criminal cases and 9
"general practice in all courts". My eyes gave out after this much "non-doctrinal"
research, but I doubt that the situation would be much different in other large
cities.
a Steinberg, Professional Careers for the Defense Lawyer, 7 Student Law J.
April, 1962, p. 6; cf. Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Prac-
tice, 47 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 176 (1964).
4 Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to Modem Times 5 (1953).
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Furthermore, most lawyers do a fairly substantial amount of civil
work without asking or expecting remuneration, which suggests
that the financial issue is inherently spurious.
Another is to say that one cannot practice ethically. But the
experience of the typical small-town attorney or of the English
barrister suggests that the same ethical standards can be main-
tained in a criminal as in a civil practice. Or one may plead loss
of clients because of the "guilt by association" attitudes of
potential clients. Whether or not such a community attitude
actually exists, popularity is not ordinarily a criterion of profes-
sionalism.5 None of these stated reasons is particularly persuasive
when measured by the lawyer's practice as a whole; non-participa-
tion must therefore be symptomatic of a basic antipathy toward
criminal law.
Another manifestation of this inadequacy is the low level of
professional standards in the practice of criminal law in metro-
politan areas. 6 While there are a few reputable attorneys who
engage principally in the defense of criminal cases, many lawyers
who appear day after day in the criminal courts cut corners in
ways that hazard discipline or disbarment. They solicit clients in
the courtroom and corridors, hire jailors and court attendants to
steer defendants their way, have tie-ins with bailbondsmen, split
fees for referrals from other lawyers and suborn perjury by
witnesses. Some are in effect "house counsel" for criminal groups
engaged in prostitution and the narcotics traffic. The persistence
of these unethical practices is chiefly the responsibility of the bar
itself. Bar association officers and members of committees on
grievances and ethics rarely appear in or visit criminal courts
and know little or nothing of the conditions under which counsel
in routine criminal cases operate. Occasionally a disciplinary case
arises from some particularly flagrant violation of professional
decorum, but the result is usually only a feeling on the part of the
lawyer disciplined that he is being picked on, because everyone
else is doing the same thing.1 Shady practices are usually well
5 National Council on Legal Clinics, Joint Conference on Professional Re-
sponsibility Report 10, 11-12 (1958); Sacks, Defending the Unpopular Client.6 Carlin, Lawyers On Their Own 105-09 (1962).
7 marginal practitioner can be called the prostitute of the profession.
Cf. Pike, Beyond the Law 2 (1963). In terms of random enforcement, mechanical
imposition of punishments, sullen resentment on the part of the person punished(Continued on next page)
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controlled when the leadership of the profession takes an interest;
the lack of real concern is simply one more manifestation of non-
participation which suggests an inability to cope with the special
problems of criminal law practice.
Another symptom is the inherent irrelevance of the canons
of professional ethics themselves to the problems of a modern
criminal law practice. What may have been an adequate state-
ment of ideas for early nineteenth-century Philadelphia or late
nineteenth-century Alabama' is hardly sufficient to cover practice
before a special sessions court in Manhattan or recorder's court
in Detroit. For example, the use of runners or steerers is pro-
hibited," and any type of advertising 0 directed to the public is a
basis for discipline. The basic principle is acceptable, but it
ignores completely the plight of the average person under arrest,
not indigent but without a lawyer on retainer. The canons pre-
sume that he knows the names and reputations of local attorneys,
but if he does not and no lists of criminal law specialists1 are
available to him, he is forced to turn to the only source open to
him-the policeman, turnkey or bailiff. Or take the instance of
the lawyer who knows his client's whereabouts when the police
do not,12 or knows where incriminating evidence is when the
prosecuting attorney does not.'3 Some authorities asert that he
is under a duty to tell or to turn over material, though without
considering what this would mean to the concept of a defense
through counsel if it were rigorously enforced. The canons offer
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
and projection of guilt on the agency which punishes, the prostitute and the
marginal lawyer are strikingly similar. Cf. George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric
Considerations in the Control of Prostitution, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 717, 753, 759-60
(1962), with Carlin, op. cit. supra note 6, at 168-84.
S Drinker, Legal Ethics 23-26 (1953).
9 A.B.A. Canon 28; A.B.A. Op. No. 147. [These and other similar references
appear in American Bar Ass'n, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances (1957)].
"o A.B.A. Canons 27, 43, 46; A.B.A. Ops. 59, 69, 114, 175, 191, 205, 251, 286.
11 Michigan recognizes as specialties only admiralty and patents, trade-marks
and copyrights. Mich. Ethics Op. 158 [Michigan ethics opinions are found in 38
Mich. S. B. J., May, 1959.]
12 Cf. the exchange in Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 8-9(1951), and Drinl:er, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis "The Ethics of Advocacy,
4 Stan. L. Rev. 349 (1952). See also A.B.A. Ops. No. 155 and 156, but cf. Op.
No. 23.
13 See Clark v. State, 1599 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339 (1953), which
held a lawyer's overheard advice to his client, "Get rid of the weapon and sit
tight and dont talk to anyone, and I will fly down in the morning", not a
privileged communication. However, Harvell v. State, 395 P.2d 331 (Okla. Crim.
1964) suggests that the defendant commits no crime if he destroys evidence.
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very little which is directly helpful, and the leadership of the bar
does nothing to establish guidelines for practice, which contrasts
markedly with their reaction when problems of contingent fees,' 4
legal services by unions for their members 5 or intra-firm con-
flicts of interest10 and the like arise. Inadequate canons of ethics
reveal inadequacy of the bar itself.
Finally, the inadequacy of the profession to represent criminal
defendants is revealed by the "guilt by association", "how-can-
you-defend-him-when-you-know-he's-guilty" attitude of a great
many citizens. The attitude is not new; the establishment of
most of what is labelled "the rule of law" has been in the face of
prevalent citizen reaction that safeguards are unnecessary or even
undesirable. Yet where defense of criminal cases is concerned,
the legal profession rarely takes a firm position affirming the
integrity of the attorney who represents unpopular defendants
and affording the citizen relatively little scope to discriminate
economically against criminal defense lawyers.'7 This, I believe,
is because the legal profession itself displays the same "guilt by
association" attitude, though usually in more subtle ways, and
thus reinforces rather than counteracts lay prejudice. In these
and other ways, the aftermath to Gideon v. Wainwright will
almost certainly reveal the inadequacy of the profession as a
whole to provide competent counsel in criminal cases.
II. CUss FOR =EE CONDMON
With a generally debilitated patient, the physician is some-
times puzzled as to what to do first. A like dilemma faces the legal
profession. Perhaps one possibility is simply to let the patient
die, in this case by accepting an ever-diminishing role for the
lawyer in the administration of criminal justice. To a large extent
our profession is already excluded from vital areas of criminal law
administration like the sentencing process, probation and parole,
14 Judge Sharswood thought the contingent fee unethical. Sharswood, Pro-
fessional Ethics 85-92 (1854). Canon 13 permits the practice under certain
conditions.
15 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
877 U.S. 1 (1964), and cf. NAACP v. Button, 871 U.S. 415 (1968). For an earlier,
similar problem, see Weihofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs-Useful But
Forbidden, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 296 (1986).
16 Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and
Intra-Firmr Conflicts of Interest, 78 Yale L. J. 1058 (1964).
17 See the materials gathered in Sacks, op. cit. supra note 5.
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prison administration, release of the criminally insane and the
commitment, transfer and release of the mentally abnormal whose
activities pose a threat to the community and to themselves. We
have been substantially excluded from judicial processes affecting
children and adolescents, though there are some signs that our
function in that area is becoming a stronger one.'8 But the
problem of crime in society remains and grows, and the clamor
by persons trained in other fields for authorization to solve it
increases. 9 If the legal profession does not respond to the
challenge, others will. Unless there is a marked change in both
the attitudes and activities of the organized legal profession, the
patient wil die; as a profession we will then largely content
ourselves with the practice of law in more antiseptic fields.
Perhaps, however, the judiciary can assist in forcing the
profession as a whole to come to grips with its ailments and try
to do something about them. I see at least two possibilities. One
is through insistence that the canons of professional ethics be
modernized and made adequate for modem practice. For this
to be accomplished, however, bar leadership will have to be
shaken from lethargy, and recommendations for change initiated
by those who know from experience what the criminal law
practitioner faces and how difficult it is for the typical criminal
defendant to make contact with and cooperate with him. A com-
mittee of corporation, probate and tax lawyers is not a likely
source for an adequate revision of the canons.
The second is that trial judges can require that every member
of the bar in the county or city assume his share of the burden
of defending indigent defendants. The reaction to this will range
from grumbles to roars of protest. Many experienced lawyers
will have to go back to kindergarten to found themselves in the
essentials of criminal procedure. Many of them will make errors,
though probably not major or irredeemable ones if they expend
the same care that they would in appearing for a corporate client.
But if each lawyer has to appear in three or five or a dozen cases
each year, he may develop a concern about criminal law ad-
ministration which he does not evince now.
Is Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 Cornell L. Q. 387
(1961).
19 Cf. Kubie, Research in Judicial Administration: A Psychiatrist's View, 39
B.U.L. Rev. 157, 161-63 (1959).
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Nevertheless, mere exposure to the problems of a criminal
defense will not solve the problem completely, because the roots
of the antipathy toward criminal cases which the bar evidences
go deeper than mere economics or a low rate of exposure to
criminal defendants. They rest in attitudes which take firm hold
in the course of legal education, attitudes which stem from the
conflict which exposure to criminal and family law materials
engenders.
A perceptive person is aware that he has the same basic drives
the typical criminal has, but that in the process of physical,
psychic and social maturation he has succeeded in controlling
most of them within acceptable bounds. It will take an unusual
combination of circumstances before he is likely to commit an act
so deviant as to warrant criminal prosecution. But this awareness
of capacity to do the forbidden is not a particularly comfortable
one to entertain, and so he represses his awareness by projecting
on to others the capacity to do evil acts, by denying that evil acts
exist, by deriving a (false) sense of security from the belief that
the courts and other agencies are taking care of evil-doers, and
the like. The average citizen has to be caught up in an event
within his family or immediate societal group before his defensive
armor is pierced by a sense of kinship with the offender.
But a law student is in a particularly vulnerable position, for
he is forced into contact with at least vicarious recitals of criminal
conduct which revive all the old resolved conflicts. He is faced by
situation after situation in which people like himself, in circum-
stances which he either has experienced or recognizes that he
might well experience, have killed, committed acts of sexual
aggression, breached trust, stolen or even driven an automobile
without an operator's permit in possession. Some students are
comfortable enough in adjusting to strains like this that they
achieve the insight that while there is kinship, there are dif-
ferences in ability to control impulses, that society has a claim
to protect itself from injurious conduct, that there may be various
ways to accomplish this protection, and that sometimes this is
through criminal punishments and sometimes not.
Without help, however, a great many students relieve the
stress in some other way. A student may revive his infantile
attitude that if only the right words are said or the proper acts
[Vol. 53,
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done, the problem will be conjured out of existence. If this is
the escape avenue chosen, he very probably will seek avidly after
concrete propositions of law, commit them to memory, and resist
suggestions that these propositions may be ineffective or even
detrimental to crime control. This is a common lay and legislative
attitude, but it characterizes large segments of the law student
body and of the bar as well, typified, for example, by reactions
when changes in the canons of ethics are proposed.
Or he may well carry on a process of projection, in which he
persists in maintaining that only "they", particularly the "theys"
who are the defendants in criminal cases, are bad, inherently bad,
and commit criminal acts, and that the evil will be suppressed
only if "they" are suppressed. The greater the subconscious
awareness that the criminal is pretty close to the student, the
harder this attitude probably will be. This is likely to lead to an
insistence that harsh laws be enacted and rigorously enforced,
and an attitude of tough cynicism toward all offenders.
But it is most likely that he will take flight from the source of
discomfort. I suspect that a great many persons who leave law
school voluntarily during the course of the first year are fleeing
an internal conflict. Though I am unaware of any studies on the
matter, this withdrawal may often stem from a failure to resolve
satisfactorily an apparent conflict between personal standards of
idealism and the self-image of a fledgling professional which the
student holds, and the apparent preoccupation of the law with
rules and specifies which the first-year curriculum so often sug-
gests. If all of this threatens disintegration, the student drops
out to resolve the conflict summarily.
Most probably, however, he will execute a partial flight by
avoiding criminal and family law, where his awareness of his own
involved humanity is greatest, and taking refuge in other areas
of law where the appearances are that he can manipulate people
as things without personal involvement. If any raw nerve endings
of idealism remain, he can anesthetize them by stating that money
is his goal. The attitudes of the faculty and influential alumni
strongly reinforce the student's position and make it seem the
20 1 am confirmed in this belief by letters from law students and would-be
law students in response to my article in Harper's Magazine, April, 1964, p. 183;
all reflected this -'iew.
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right one. In brief, by the second or third year most law students
are miniatures of their elders. If nothing is done to change these
processes in law school, the bar ten, twenty and thirty years from
now will show the same studied indifference to the administration
of criminal justice and to the problem of crime in society that
lawyers do today. The cure, if it is to come, must have its
genesis in legal education.
III. TOWARD A MErMOPHOSIS
A. Interdisciplinary Instruction
Significant changes in the teaching of criminal law can occur
only as faculty attitudes change as to what law is. Langdelrs
view of law as a "science", consisting of principles or doctrines,
"the mastery of (which) as to be able to apply them with con-
stant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human
affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer",21 still dominates much
of legal education. It remains ensconced in a number of criminal
law casebooks. Many law teachers continue to teach on the basis
of nineteenth and early twentieth century case reports and such
hypotheticals as whether a drunk who breaks a store window and
tries to have intercourse with a display dummy is guilty of
burglary and attempted rape. This type of teaching can only
reinforce either a feeling that the manipulation of words will cause
crime to disappear or that these "weighty" problems are time-
wasters which anyone of intellectual and profesional integrity
should abandon for more satisfying pursuits. Until the law
teacher's approach changes from an assumption that solutions
lie in adherence to propositions of law to an inquiry into the
probable roots of criminal conduct, the alternative means by
which society might cope with it, the standards by which deviant
behavior is to be officially identified and the procedural frame-
work within which designated officials are to act, there will be
little noticeable change in student reactions to criminal law. It is
essential that we honor the question more than the answer.
If the emphasis is on the question and not on the pat answer,
it is inevitable that the relationship between law and the be-
2 1 Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts vi (1871).
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havioral and social sciences will manifest itself. Foreign ob-
servers of the American university invariably are struck by the
wall of isolation between the law faculty and other segments of
the academic community. While some blame attaches to both
sides of that wall, it is to me principally the Langdellian approach
and the sense of superiority it too often engenders which keep
it in repair. Whenever criminal law and procedure are accorded
a dynamic function rooted in the community, the criminal law
teacher finds himself allied with and not opposed to anthro-
pologists, economists, political scientists, psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists and sociologists, and able for the first time to talk with
them. He then usually does so.
After conversations are well under way, the thought of
collaborative teaching almost certainly arises. If professors are
helped by conversation, students should be also. But there are
several barriers to this. One is the deadly pall of administrative
practice. Law schools are law schools and other departments
other departments, and no lines of communication exist. Deans
and department chairmen watch one another like hawks to see
that not one dollar of the budget enures to the benefit of anyone
else. Another is that faculty resistance is high to the idea that
work done elsewhere in the university can count toward the
prized degree offered by the school or department concerned. A
third is the assumption by law teachers that an entering law
student who holds a baccalaureate degree can make his own
synthesis between what he has learned earlier in the social and
behavioral sciences and what he will learn in law school. This, I
submit, is a fallacy. Law teachers themselves have rarely suc-
ceeded in doing so, and I see no reason to expect that students
will accomplish the feat unaided. A fourth is the feeling of
comfort on the part of each faculty member concerned. It is
much easier to continue in established patterns, talking with
colleagues who "understand" and publishing for the small coterie
of those who "appreciate". The role of the herald who parleys
with "them" is seldom attractive, since he may find himself cut
off from his own adherents and surrounded by clouds of hostiles.
All the forces of the university appear mustered against the sub-
versives who would cooperate.
Yet cooperative teaching is both possible and immensely
19651
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rewarding. I have experienced it in at least three contexts, 22 all
related to the basic criminal law course is that with Dr. Andrew
Watson, who holds a joint appointment in the Law School and
the Department of Psychiatry of the Medical School; we are full-
fledged partners in teaching one section of the criminal law
course. As our experience and confidence in each other have
grown, we have found ourselves achieving several goals during
the course of the year.23
One, of course, continues to be instruction in basic criminal
legislation and its interpretation. But we aim also at an analysis
of the assumptions which appear to underlie that legislation and
their validity when viewed from psychiatry, sociology and other
disciplines. The result is a somewhat fuller concept of criminal
legislation than is possible in a common law-oriented course.
A second is to give the students experience in handling
scientific material. To a degree this means ignoring traditional
curricular boundaries, since problems of expert witnesses are
supposed to appear in evidence and (civil) procedure, both third
year courses in our curriculum. But whenever we throw down
the fences between law and other disciplines by permitting a
questioning of the assumptions on which traditional definitions
of crime rest, the students invariably want to know what other
investigations have turned up. Dr. Watson's background in
biology, medicine and psychiatry permits him to act as an expert,
but the burden is on the student to ask the relevant questions
and develop the material he needs. These skills are particularly
necessary in coping with psychiatric evidence under whatever
substantive doctrine of insanity is established in the state. Law-
yers and judges who would instantly spot the problem if a ques-
tion were directed to a ballistics expert, "Now tell me, Doctor, in
your expert opinion is the defendant guilty of murder?", lie down,
roll over and play dead when a psychiatric expert witness gives
his opinion that the defendant is "insane", "knows right from
22 Including joint seminars with visiting foreign scholars and participation in
an area studies program in the University of Michigan Center for Japanese Studies.
of which have proven stimulating. The association most directly
23 See also Watson, Reflections on the Teaching of Criminal Law, 37 U. Det.
L. J. 701 (1960); Teaching Mental Health Concepts in the Law School, 33 Am.
J. Orthopsych. 115 (1963); and cf. Watson, Family Law and Its Challenge For
Psychiatry, 2 J. Fain. L. 71 (1962).
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wrong", "was irresistibly impelled" or whatever. Or they accept
implicitly a statement that a person is "schizophrenic", a "sexual
psychopath" or a "sociopath". In a year's time, our students, we
feel, become relatively well-skilled in probing beneath a con-
clusion in legal terms or a mere diagnostic label to the data, if any,
on which the diagnosis rests, and in relating all the data to the
issue of criminal responsibility.
A third is in permitting the student to gain insight into his
reactions to criminals and criminal situations. This is the point
at which I as the lawyer member of the team have had to make
the greatest departure from tradition, since it takes only a little
"cutting a man down to size" by ridicule or dismissal of an idea
as irrelevant, non-legal or emotional in content to dry up any
references to other than black-letter law; law teaching methods
often appear to place a premium on these classroom methods.
If, however, the student becomes aware that he is not decapitated
verbally when he expresses his feelings about a problem, he will
usually find that he and many of his classmates are reacting
identically and, depending on how the instructors handle it,
according to pattern. This is the first step toward insight into the
way his own mind operates and why and how he needs to take
account of and compensate for his own reactions. While this
process at first seems a sacrifice of "coverage" for indefinable
gains, Dr. Watson and I have found that after about the first half
of the course we are getting more quickly at the heart of crimnal
law problems than had earlier been the case, because of develop-
ing skills of the students in recognizing what part of the problem
is their own reactions and what part the externals of the problem
at hand.
The fourth is the growing sense of professional identification
which the class manifests as the year wears on. It may be that
ethics, as morals, are "learned at mother's knee", but the primary
problem is in deciding what is ethical in a problem situation.
The attitudes of the professional ethicists of the legal world
suggest that all that is necessary is to consult a handbook of the
canons and ethics opinions. But anything capable of that easy
a solution poses no real ethical problem. A man has an image of
himself as a professional in which service is primary and liveli-
hood secondary. Ethical conflicts most often arise when the
1965]
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conduct called for suggests a hireling more than a benefactor
or stresses sheer financial return over a sense of satisfaction
through service. When the problem is perceived in terms of a
conflict between what a man's selfish instincts urge and his self-
respect, based on his image of himself as a professional, requires,24
he is well on his way toward a satisfactory resolution of the
conflict. If he recognizes also that uncertainty is always a part
of the process, he can act and go on to other things. Whatever
the actual reason, joint instruction appears to produce a more
realistic attitude toward problems of professional ethics than do
the traditional lectures on the subject.
One unexpected by-product of this is that we acquire a
sprinkling of students who cross divisional lines from other parts
of the University. This year, for example, we have acquired by
means unknown to us two graduate students in the School of
Social Work, a social psychologist and a sociologist. Because they
have been encouraged to participate as auxiliary experts, we
have found that we have also "acquired" experts in engineering,
statistics and anthropology from within the law student group.
Cooperative instruction appears to precipitate a synthesis be-
tween undergraduate specialties and law study which more
traditional instruction does not.
Of course, some teaching materials are better for this type of
instruction than others. Dr. Watson and I use the Donnelly,
Goldstein and Schwartz2 5 materials, which are the most satis-
factory for the purpose of the several casebook collections from
which we have taught. No set of materials is ever wholly satis-
factory to the man who did not compile them (or probably to
the man who did), but we have found that very little supple-
mentation is necessary for us to achieve our course aims.2 6
One can legitimately ask whether collaborative instruction is
feasible within the limitation of an ordinary budget. Experience
at several schools suggests that it is. Most universities have
medical centers, hospitals or clinics with qualified analysts on
24 From the student's viewpoint, this is approximately the same problem that
arises when his lurking awareness of how much he and the criminal share collides
with his awareness that all the conduct in question is forbidden and therefore
bad. He resolves or represses both problems in about the same fashion.25 Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law (1962).
26 This experience confirms me in the favorable view expressed in my review
of the book in 60 Mich. L. Rev. 672 (1962).
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their staffs. One or more will very probably be responsive to
overtures from a criminal law professor. Collaboration almost
always begins with a discussion of shared problems, flowers
during a period in which each partner familiarizes himself as a
layman with the other's discipline, and bears fruit when the two
share the same classroom. Missionary work helps. Dr. Watson,
for example, usually has a resident in psychiatry attend each
criminal law section, which can be a first step toward cooperation
at a later time either at Michigan or some other institution.
Visiting criminal law professors can be encouraged to make use
of one of the medical residents. Graduate students interested in
criminal law can be invited to attend and react to the method of
joint instruction. One may even foresee professorial research
grants which contemplate experimentation in interdisciplinary
teaching. While budgetary and personnel problems cannot be
dismissed out of hand, the chief hurdle is to find two people
willing to forgo the comfort and security of traditional course
content and teaching method for the perils and rewards of the
explorer.
B. Comparative Law Teaching
As an adjunct to interdisciplinary teaching, law schools should
consider increased use of comparative law materials. It is only
the legal jingoist who is unwilling to examine another legal sys-
tem with care. Other countries are faced with the same problems
of crime and society with which we grapple. If we go beyond the
superficial differences in the way in which the legal norms are
stated, and in the organization of courts and prosecutors' offices,
to examine what the foreign legislator or administrator has set
out to accomplish and the results he has achieved, we may well
find ideas capable of being utilized here at home. Even at the
conceptual level the system of the civil law is in stark contrast
to the typical disorder of American legislation. In short, one of
the best ways to study one's own system is to study another's. Of
course, what is foreign is not necessarily good. But we should be
after is an idea already implemented and tested by experience
in other countries which we may ourselves adapt to our own
circumstances. The growing rate of faculty and graduate student
exchanges in law attests the basic functionality of such study.
19651
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Each law school must decide for itself how to incorporate
foreign materials into its curriculum. Sometimes translations of
foreign code provisions can be included in a casebook. This may
prove helpful in teaching criminal law, but presents pitfalls in
the case of criminal procedure, because an isolated procedural
statute can be terribly misleading if separated from the code as
a whole and divorced from the actual scheme of administration.
Seminars are more effective than random references in a basic
course if the instructor has experience in another legal system.
Here, too, joint instruction is invaluable, with the partner in this
instance being a foreign lawyer or professor.
While there are practical problems to solve, there are more
available means of solution than administrators and faculty
generally realize. The Committee on Foreign Exchanges of the
Association of American Law Schools often has the names of
qualified foreign scholars receptive to a visiting appointment."
United States Educational (Fulbright) Foundations and Com-
missions almost always can supply names of outstanding scholars
in law, and may sometimes even cooperate materially by award-
ing a travel grant to the person selected, provided arrangements
are cleared sufficiently in advance. The Asia Foundation oc-
casionally cooperates in the same way. Schools operating within
a limited budget but interested in trying the experiment should
not overlook the products of the several foreign graduate pro-
grams in American law schools. At Michigan alone we have
annually six to ten people among our foreign visitors qualified
linguistically and professionally to cooperate with an adventure-
some American teacher in giving a joint seminar; the cost to the
host institution might not exceed $2,500-$3,000 a semester. An-
other experiment might be a summer workshop program spon-
sored by the Association of American Law Schools or one or more
law schools with experience in foreign and comparative law at
which criminal law and procedure teachers without substantial
acquaintance with foreign law could receive a capsule course
in the substantive and procedural law of one or two other
countries, and advice as to how to proceed to acquire more experi-
ence and knowledge. Whatever the means, comparative law has
27The Foreign Exchange Bulletin issued by the committee is helpful in this
respect.
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a role to play in prying loose the teaching of criminal law and
procedure from its case system mold.
C. Integration of Law and Philosophy
A third area to which law schools should direct their attention
is the interrelationship between law on the one hand and philoso-
phy and theology on the other.28 Some philosophers and theo-
logians may occupy themselves some of the time with more
general and abstract issues than lawyers usually find themselves
involved with. But a philosopher or theologian worth his salt
wants to set the specific problems which men face in a larger
context; the specific problems from which he starts or at which
he arrives are the same problems with which the lawyer has to
cope. Nor can a lawyer or judge ever escape the broader ethical
and moral implications of what he does. For example, if there
is any difference between shutting a man up in prison as a
criminal and confining him for an equivalent period as a mental
incompetent or a sexual psychopath, that difference is as much
moral as legal or functional. If the law says that a woman can
be aborted if she has a heart condition which may kill her if she
goes into labor at term, but not if she has taken thalidomide
during the first trimester of pregnancy or conceived as the result
of rape, several moral issues are involved. To free an abortionist
to ply his trade until caught again because the police failed to
knock and announce themselves before breaking into his premises
to arest him is more than a matter of judicial administration or
constitutional policy. Very few questions of importance can be
satisfactorily disposed of on a purely technical basis.
This does not mean, of course, that philosophy or theology
has pat answers to the lawyer's problems. In fact, with the
possible exception of Roman Catholic moral theology,2 9 no theo-
logical or philosophical school purports to grapple with the crimi-
nal la-yer's problems. Most Protestant seminary courses and
books on Christian ethics are at the "God is Love" level, and most
university courses in Ethics are historical surveys. In many
respects the lawyer has as much to contribute to a discussion as
the philosopher or theologian. To my mind, therefore, this is an
2S See Curtis, Ethics in the Law, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 477 (1952).29 Cf. O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law, 5 Natural L. F. 83 (1960).
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area in which co-instruction offers great promise. Tentative
exploration of the idea at Michigan suggests that philosophy
and seminary faculty members are quite favorably inclined
toward the idea and that money from outside sources is probably
available to finance the experiment. Alternatively, most law
faculties have one or more members well enough founded in
philosophy that a jurisprudence offering can be arranged based
on problems of criminal law policy. In this as in most other
respects, the students are ahead of the faculty, so that faculty
initiative is the chief need.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, if the attitudes toward and practices of the pro-
fession in criminal cases are to change, the impetus is most likely
to come through changes in legal education. These changes,
however, are not simply pleasant options, but are absolutely
necessary if criminal law is to remain a living discipline. The
community manifests increasing impatience with traditional legal
processes and archaic legal definitions as means to counter the
growing problems of crime and delinquency. The legal profession
does little to stem this impatience, and indeed feeds it, not by
what it says about the desirability and adequacy of traditional
practices, but by its collective unwillingness to give serious
consideration even to the question of whether a problem exists.
If lawyers and judges deny that there is any special problem of
crime in society, if they treat as outcasts those lawyers who take
criminal cases primarily or exclusively, if they persist in treating
the canons of ethics as if they were graven on stone tablets, and
if they characterize criticism from non-lawyers as irresponsible,
uninformed or unworthy of notice, the result will not be to
suppress the criticism. Instead, their indifference will serve to
remove law and the legal profession as relevant factors in society's
effort to cope with a situation which non-lawyers know to exist
even if lawyers do not. If lawyers become corporation tinkerers
or tax law mechanics, while mental health boards, social welfare
departments, "conduct supervisory officers" and other assorted
administrative officials supplant the courts as instrumentalities
for crime and delinquency control, they have only their own
inactivity and insensitivity to blame. If the legal profession is to
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play the role it should, its members must learn to work with and
not in defiance or ignorance of other disciplines. A changed
concept of criminal law teaching should permit it to play that
role; to cling to the traditional patterns of teaching and practice
probably means either professional suicide or the perpetuation
of incompetence and injustice.
